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http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/2019-07/08/content_5407361.htm

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2014[3] 2008[4]

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Kahnemah and Tversky 1979[5]

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$$U = \sum_{i=1}^{n} [U(X_i) * \pi(P_i)] \quad (1)$$

$U(X_i)$

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$\pi(P_i)$

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2020 3

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1 “ ”

1 “ ”

A

B C 2010[6]

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1 1 B=C

2 2 B>C

2014[7]

2016[8]

2015[9]

1999[10]

“ ”

2019[11] “ ” “ ”

2017[12] 2018[13]

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1

A>B

2

A=B

3

A<B

2

习情况
习普通

Langer 1981 [14] “ ”

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“ ”

“ ” “ ” $\pi(P_1) > \pi(P_2)$

$\pi(1-P_1) < \pi(1-P_2)$ “ ” $\pi(P_1)$ “ ”

$\pi(1-P_1)$ “ ”

$\pi(P_2)$ “ ”

$\pi(1-P_2)$

“ ”

“ ” $\pi(P_1) = \pi(P_2)$

$\pi(1-P_1) = \pi(1-P_2)$

$\pi(P_1) < \pi(P_2)$ $\pi(1-P_1) > \pi(1-P_2)$

3

习情况

Langer 1981

习普通

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(1)

$\pi(P_1)$ $\pi(1-P_1)$

$$U_{11}=U(A-B)\times\pi(P_1)+U(B-B)\times\pi(1-P_1) \quad (2)$$

(2)

$$U_{12}=U(B-B) \quad (3)$$

(3) “ ”

$\pi(P_1)$ $\pi(1-P_1)$

$$U_{21}=U(A-B)\times\pi(P_2)+U(C-B)\times\pi(1-P_2) \quad (4)$$

(4)

$$U_{22}=U(B-B) \quad (5)$$

4

$$\Delta = U - U = U_{22} - U_{12} \quad (6)$$

$$\Delta = U(B-B) - U(B-B) \quad (7)$$

$$\Delta = 0 \quad (8)$$

$$U = U \quad (9)$$

$$\Delta = U - U = U_{21} - U_{11} \quad (10)$$

$$\Delta = U(A-B)\times\pi(P_2) + U(C-B)\times\pi(1-P_2) - U(A-B)\times\pi(P_1) + U(B-B)\times\pi(1-P_1) \quad (11)$$

$$U(B-B) = 0$$

$$\Delta = U(A-B)\times\pi(P_2) + U(C-B)\times\pi(1-P_2) - U(A-B)\times\pi(P_1) \quad (12)$$

$$\Delta = U(A-B)\times[\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] + U(C-B)\times\pi(1-P_2) \quad (13)$$

1 $U(C-B) = 0$

$$\Delta = U(A-B)\times[\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] \quad (14)$$

1 $\pi(P_1) > \pi(P_2)$ $U(A-B) > 0$

$$U(A-B) > 0 \quad (15)$$

$$\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1) < 0 \quad (16)$$

$$\Delta < 0 \quad (17)$$

$$U < U \quad (18)$$

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2 $\pi(P_1) = \pi(P_2)$ $U(A-B) = 0$

$$U(A-B) = 0 \quad (19)$$

$$\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1) = 0 \quad (20)$$

$$\Delta = 0 \tag{21}$$

$$U \quad = U \tag{22}$$

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3 $\pi(P_1) < \pi(P_2)$ $U(A-B) < 0$

$$U(A-B) < 0 \tag{23}$$

$$\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1) > 0 \tag{24}$$

$$\Delta < 0 \tag{25}$$

$$U \quad < U \tag{26}$$

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$U(C-B) < 0$

$$\Delta = U(A-B) \times [\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] + U(C-B) \times \pi(1-P_2) \tag{27}$$

1 $\pi(P_1) > \pi(P_2)$ $U(A-B) > 0$

$$U(A-B) \times [\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] < 0 \tag{28}$$

$$U(C-B) \times \pi(1-P_2) < 0 \tag{29}$$

$$\Delta < 0 \tag{30}$$

$$U \quad < U \tag{31}$$

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2 $\pi(P_1) = \pi(P_2)$ $U(A-B) = 0$

$$U(A-B) \times [\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] = 0 \tag{32}$$

$$U(C-B) \times \pi(1-P_2) < 0 \tag{33}$$

$$\Delta < 0 \tag{34}$$

$U \quad < U$ (35)

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3 $\pi(P_1) < \pi(P_2) \quad U(A-B) < 0$

$U(A-B) \times [\pi(P_2) - \pi(P_1)] < 0$ (36)

$U(C-B) \times \pi(1-P_2) < 0$ (37)

$\Delta < 0$ (38)

$U \quad < U$ (39)

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类	习表现	变化	
		办初中	办初中
统筹公办初中价值等于对口公办价值	习优秀	变	
	习良好	变	变
	习普通	变	
			( )
统筹公办初中价值低于对口公办价值	**习优秀**	**变**	
	习良好	变	

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2018[15]

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[1] . “ ” “ ” “ ” [J]. ,2020(12):30-34+57.

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The policy effect of " citizens enrolling together " under the background of " pupils from primary school to junior secondary school "

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Abstract: In 2020, major cities across the country have implemented the policy of "citizens enrolling at the same time" to alleviate the problem of "school selection fever" of private schools in the stage of compulsory education. Based on the prospect theory and the pupils from primary school to junior secondary school in Shanghai as the background, this paper investigates the impact of the policy on the choice of junior secondary school in the context of public school differences and students' different learning performance. The results show that: after the policy, the school selection effect of counterpart public junior secondary schools remains unchanged; Private junior secondary schools will generally decline. Therefore, the introduction of the policy of "citizens recruiting together" will help to alleviate the current problem of "private school selection fever"; The reasons for the decline of the effectiveness of private junior middle schools are different for people with different students` learning performance, which can be divided into active loss avoidance and passive risk avoidance. In view of the above conclusions, this paper puts forward the corresponding countermeasures and suggestions.

Key words: Pupils from Primary School to Junior Secondary School; Citizens Enrolling Together; Policy Effect; Prospect Theory